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1. You cannot completely control relationships, so trust and embrace the chaos. 
2. Trust does not rule out control, if used together they in-fact work more effectively than the sum 
of the parts (chapter 2). 
3. Trust begets trust, but trust and control beget both trust and performance (chapter 2). 
4. If you uphold a promise you build calculus-based trust. You build identification-based trust when 
you trust your partner with more than what you promised (chapter 3). 
5. Trust is built in a cyclic manner, whereby relational signals and intentions are evaluated and 
authenticated every now and then (chapter 3). 
6. Credible commitments in the form of contracts limit the opportunities and incentives for 
opportunism and are, therefore, a source of calculus-based trust (chapter 4). 
7. Institutional trust indicates the confidence an actor has in institutions giving credibility and 
legitimacy to contracts (chapter 4). 
8. Trust in the political, social, economic and legal institutions helps build IOR trust by first building 
calculus-based trust (chapter 4). 
9. Creation of knowledge concerns understanding and appreciating what no one else was able to 
comprehend. 
10. Men with long hair are the main reason I have trust issues. 
11. Logic, reason and science are the death of dogma.  
